GREThA UMR - CNRS 5113
Université Montesquieu - Université de Bordeaux
Avenue Léon Duguit
33608 PESSAC CEDEX
Titre de la thèse
Directeur de thèse
Co-directeur de thèse
Date de début de la thèse
Thèmes de recherche
- Networks Formation
- Game Theory
- Industrial Economics
- 2010- : Teaching assistant in Microeconomics Undergraduate
- 2013- : Teaching assistant in Statistics Undergraduate
Présentation/résumé de la thèse
This thesis focuses on the relationship between partners based on markets with heterogeneous forms of competition. Generally speaking, this thesis propose to investigate vertical industrial relationships from a systemic point of view. This study is mainly a theoretical approach based on networks theory and game theory. A great part of the study addresses the issue of bargaining between the agents involved in those networks.
- 1st Bordeaux Economic Theory Workshop on "Interactions, Institutions and Design", Université Montesquieu, Bordeaux May 28th 2013
- 14th Public Economic Theory (PET13), Catolica, Lisbon, July 5-7 2013
- 13th SAET Conference on Current Trends in Economics, MINES ParisTech, Paris, July 22-27, 2013
- 5th UECE Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications, ISEG, Lisbon, November 7-9 2013
- The Seawall bargaining Game, Games 2014, 5(2), 127-139 With JC Pereau :
- Agents located from downstream to upstream along an estuary and exposed to a flooding risk have to invest in facilities like a seawall (or dike). As the benefits of that local public good increase along the estuary, upstream agents have to bargain for monetary compensation with the most downstream agent in exchange for more protection effort. The paper analyses different bargaining protocols and determines the conditions under which agents are better off. The results show that upstream agents are involved in a chicken game when they have to bargain with the most downstream agent.
- Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation With N. Carayol & V. Vannetelbosch :
We propose a concept to study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. A set of networks is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if there exists an allocation rule and a bargaining threat such that (i) there is no farsighted improving path from one network inside the set to another network inside the set, (ii) from any network outside the set there is a farsighted improving path to some network inside the set, (iii) the value of each network is allocated among players so that players su§er or benefit equally from being linked to each other compared to the allocation they would obtain at their respective credible bargaining threat. We show that the set of strongly effcient networks is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if the allocation rule is anonymous and component effcient and the value function is top convex. Moreover, the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerges endogenously.